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Abstract
With the ubiquitous nature of social networks and cloud computing, we are starting to explore a new way
to interact with and exploit these developing paradigms. Social cloud (SC) is a service or resource sharing
framework on top of social networks and built on the trust-based social relationships. In recent years, the
idea of SC has been gaining importance because of its potential applicability. This article introduces a novel
SC management scheme with a view of game theory model and reciprocal resource sharing mechanism. In
particular, we devise a new transformable Stackelberg game to coordinate the interdependence between
social structure and resource availability for individual users. Our proposed scheme constantly monitors the
current SC system conditions and adaptively exploits the available resources while ensuring mutual fairness.
The simulation results show that the proposed method is effective in distributed SC environments and
adaptively supports application executions timely and ubiquitously.
Keywords: Social cloud system, Transformable Stackelberg game, Dynamic resource sharing, Reciprocal fairness,
Game theory
1 Introduction
Digital relationships between individual people become
more and more embedded in our daily actions, and they
can be powerful influences in our real-life. Moreover, we
are now connected with all our social networks through
mobile devices. The increasing ubiquity of social networks
is evidenced by the growing popularity of social network
services. A social network service consists of a representa-
tion of each user, his or her social links, and a variety of
additional services. Usually, social networks provide a plat-
form to facilitate communications and resource sharing
between users while modeling real-world relationships.
Therefore, a variety of social network services have ex-
tended beyond simple communication among users [1–3].
With the advent of social networks, cloud computing
is becoming an emerging paradigm to provide a flexible
stack of computing, software, and storage services. In a
scalable and virtualized manner over networks, cloud
users can access to fully virtualized hardware resources.
The adoption of cloud computing technology is attractive;
users obtain cloud resources, whose management is partly
automated and can be scaled almost instantaneously.
However, with the rapid development of cloud com-
puting, critical issues of cloud computing technology
have emerged. In general, modern cloud applications
are characterized by assuming a constant environment.
But real-world environments are open, dynamic, and
unpredictable [4–7].
In social networks, individual users are bound by finite
resource capacity and limited capabilities. However,
some users may have surplus resource capacity or
capabilities. Therefore, the superfluous resource could
be shared for a mutual benefit. Within the context of a
social network, users may wish to share resources with-
out payment and utilize a reciprocal credit based on the
trust model [8, 9]. To satisfy this goal, a new concept,
social cloud (SC) was introduced by combining the
methodologies of social networks and cloud computing.
SC is a novel scalable computing model where resources
are beneficially shared among a group of social network
users. From [8], we rehearse the formal definition of SC
as follows: A social cloud is a resource and service sharing
framework utilizing relationships established between
members of a social network. Based on the cloudCorrespondence: swkim01@sogang.ac.kr
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computing technique, SC model is used to enable
virtualized resource sharing through service-based
interfaces [8].
To construct the SC system in a real-world environ-
ment, there are many challenges that need to be carefully
considered. First of all, the concept of SC focuses on the
sharing rather than sale of resources. Using sharing prefer-
ences, the social context of exchange is accentuated along
with the social ties of individual users [10]. However,
social relationships are not simply edges in a graph. There
are many different types of relationship; different
users will associate different levels of trust to different
relationship contexts and have different reliability,
trustworthiness, and availability. Therefore, users may
have very specific preferences with whom they interact.
To design an effective SC control scheme, it is necessary
to take into account the preferences and perceptions of
users toward one another [10].
Under widely dynamic SC system conditions, end users
can be assumed as intelligent rational decision-makers,
and they select a best-response strategy to maximize their
expected payoffs. This situation is well-suited for the game
theory. Game theory is a field of applied mathematics that
provides an effective tool to model interactions among
independent decision-makers. It can describe the reac-
tions of one set of decision-makers to another and analyze
the situations in terms of conflict and cooperation. There-
fore, game theory is really useful in analyzing the mutual
interactions among multi-users. Thus, it can be a major
paradigm to retain an equilibrium between different users
that feature complex interactive relations [11].
In 1934, German economist H. V. Stackelberg pro-
posed a hierarchical strategic game model based on two
kinds of different decision-makers. Under a hierarchical
decision-making structure, one or more players declare
and announce their strategies before the other players
choose their strategies. In game theory terms, the declar-
ing players are called as leaders while the players who
react to the leaders are called as followers. Originally,
the Stackelberg game model was developed to explain
the monopoly of industry. The leader is the incumbent
monopoly of the industry, and the follower is a new
entrant; it can be the static bilevel optimization model
[11]. In this study, we have further extended the classical
Stackelberg model and developed a novel game mode,
called transformable Stackelberg (TS) game model. In the
TS game, each player can be a leader or a follower as the
case may be. Therefore, the position of game players is dy-
namically transformable according to current conditions.
Motivated by the above discussion, we propose a new
SC resource sharing scheme based on the TS game
model. TS game model is a useful framework for designing
decentralized mechanisms, such that users in SC systems
can self-organize into the mutually satisfactory resource
sharing process. This self-organizing feature can add auto-
nomics into SC systems and help to ease the heavy burden
of complex centralized control algorithms. Especially, we
pay serious attention to trust evaluation, repeated interac-
tions, and iterative self-learning techniques to effectively
implement our resource sharing process. In the proposed
scheme, such techniques have been incorporated into the
TS game model and work together toward an effective sys-
tem performance. Therefore, we can induce all users to
share their resources adaptively. The major contributions
of the proposed scheme are (i) the adjustable dynamics
considering the current SC environments, (ii) the inter-
active learning process based on the iterative feedback
mechanism, (iii) the sophisticated combination of the
reciprocal relationship and incentive mechanism, and (iv)
practical approach to effectively reach a desirable solution.
Other existing schemes [8, 10, 12–16] cannot offer these
attractive features.
1.1 Related work
The area of numerical methods or algorithms for effi-
cient SC control problems has been extensively studied
and has received considerable attention in recent years
[8, 10, 12–16]. In [14], Lee et al. presented the design
and development of the architecture of the just-in-time
social cloud and experimental methods to measure the
just-in-time social influences. Just-in-time social cloud
service can better guide people toward their long-term
goals by influencing their choices at the moment and
potentially mitigating behavioral biases. They attempted
to design a social platform that can be programmed to
benefit human being’s long-term goals by mitigating the
inter-temporal biases people have toward present [14].
The scheme in [8] was developed for leveraging the on-
line relationships to form a dynamic social cloud, while
enabling users to share heterogeneous resources within
the context of a social network. The socially corrective
mechanism was used to enable a cloud-based framework
for long term sharing with lower privacy concerns and
security overheads that were present in traditional cloud
environments [8].
Ali et al. developed the Cloud Resource Bartering
(CRB) model for sharing user’s computational resources
through a social network [15]. The CRB model allowed
users of online social network to share their cloud re-
sources without money changing hands. This scheme
linked a social network with the computational cloud to
create a social cloud so that users can share their part of
the cloud with their social community [15]. The scheme
in [16] considered the effect of reputation when parties
interacted in social cloud to find a new way realizing
mutual cooperation. Parities in the social cloud were ra-
tional who valued their reputation. Cooperation can boost
their reputation, so they had incentives to cooperate with
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others such that they may get a higher utility. The basic
idea in [16] was to add reputation deriving from social
cloud as part of the utility.
The Social Compute Cloud (SCC) scheme [10] was
developed for the SC interaction system. This scheme
has presented a social compute cloud platform that
enabled the sharing of infrastructure resources be-
tween friends via digitally encoded social relation-
ships. To construct a social compute cloud, the SCC
scheme accessed users’ social networks, allowed users
to elicit sharing preferences, and utilized matching
algorithms to enable preference-based socially aware
resource allocation. The Incentive-based Social Cloud
(ISC) scheme [12] was designed to model the selfish
behavior of the users who were supplying resources
and aiming to maximize their own benefits. Based on
the reputation-based pricing and collective punish-
ment mechanism, the ISC scheme compelled suppliers
to change their selfish strategies in a manner that im-
proved the efficiency of the SC system.
The Reputation-based Social Cloud (RSC) scheme [13]
added the concept of reputations as part of the utility.
This scheme described the architecture and interaction
between two rational parties in the social cloud, where
two parties received their opponent’s trust or reputation
from the social cloud. In the RSC scheme, the reputation
was affected by the interactions with other parties in the
social network. As mentioned above, numerous studies
have shown how social networks create social influences
on people’s choices across time and space. In this study,
we compared the performance of the proposed scheme
with the existing schemes in [10, 12] and [13] to confirm
the superiority of our approach.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes how insights from TS game model would help
us to incorporate learning mechanism into the SC
control scheme and to guide selfish users to achieve a
globally desirable SC system performance. Afterwards,
the main step of the proposed SC control algorithm
is presented. In Section 3, performance evaluation
results are presented along with comparisons with the
schemes proposed in [10, 12] and [13]. Through
simulation, we show the ability of proposed scheme
to achieve high accuracy and promptness in dynamic
SC environments. Finally, we end up with some con-
cluding remarks in Section 4.
2 Proposed social cloud resource sharing
algorithms
In this section, we introduce the proposed SC resource
sharing scheme in detail. Based on the TS game model,
our proposed scheme can approximate a globally desirable
system performance while ensuring user cooperations.
2.1 Transformable Stackelberg game model
Social cloud is a form of community cloud and is
designed to enable access to elastic compute capabil-
ities contributed by socially connected community
[10]. To avoid the social dilemma such as “Tragedy
of the Commons”, social incentives motivate users to
participate in, and contribute to, SC systems in
different ways. Motivation is generally categorized as
either intrinsic or extrinsic. Extrinsic motivation
represents that users are motivated by an external
reward, e.g., virtual currency. Therefore, they will
contribute to the SC while the expected benefits ex-
ceed the cost of contribution. Intrinsic motivation
represents an internal satisfaction obtained from the
task itself rather than the rewards or benefits. In
realities, people incline to cooperate with others for
reciprocation and altruism. These factors rationalize
non-economic behaviors and motivates users to con-
tribute to SC [8].
In this study, we leverage social incentives to create
ad hoc clouds without incurring the overhead of cen-
tral complex processes. To implement a fair-efficient
resource sharing mechanism, we pay serious attention
to contribution evaluation, repeated interactions, and
iterative self-learning algorithms. In the proposed
scheme, these techniques have been incorporated into
the TS game model, which is developed to let dis-
tributed players learn the best strategy in the step-by-
step interactive online manner. This approach can
induce all SC users to share resources as much as
possible and ensure a good tradeoff between the
implementation complexity for real-world SC opera-
tions and an effective system performance. Therefore,
the proposed scheme can be used to overcome one of
the major limitations of traditional SC monitoring
methods.
To characterize our proposed scheme, we design a
new TS game model G for SC systems. In a realistic SC
scenario, each user, i.e., network device, can be a
resource supplier or demander. Suppliers make their
decisions by considering the possible reactions of
demanders. Demanders react dependently based on the
decision of suppliers while attempting to maximize their
satisfaction. Therefore, in our TS game model G , sup-
pliers plays the role of leaders and demanders become
followers. Based on these assumptions, G is defined as a
tuple G = (ℕ, (Vi)i ∈ ℕ, (Si)i ∈ ℕ, (Λi)i ∈ ℕ, (Ui)i ∈ ℕ, T) at
each time period t of gameplay.
 ℕ is the finite set of players, and ℕ = {p1, …, pn}
where pi,1 ≤ i ≤ n represents the ith user. A player
can be a supplier or a demander at times. Therefore,
the position of each player would be dynamically
changeable as a leader or a follower.
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 Vi is the amount of exchangeable resources of the
player i. In this study, V is the computing capacity,
e.g., CPU cycles.
 Si is the set of strategies with the player i. If the
player i is a supplier, Si can be defined as the
amount of sharing resource. If the player i is a
demander, Si is defined as the amount of
requested resource.
 Λi is the contribution level of the player i in
the SC community.
 The Ui is the payoff received by the player i.
Traditionally, the payoff is determined as the
obtained outcome minus the cost to obtain
that outcome.
 The T is a time period. The G is repeated t ∈ T <∞
time periods with competitive and cooperative
manner.
In the SC system, each network device has its own
computation resources and executes elastic applications.
Applications can be divided into two parts: one part
runs locally and the other part can be executed on the
cloud side. Therefore, applications in each network
device can be computed either locally or remotely via
computation offloading. In general, the main challenges
to design an offloading mechanism are to decide what,
when, and how to be offloaded. In the proposed
scheme, available resources in suppliers are matched
to demanders based on the supplier-demander inter-
active relationship. According to the proposed TS
game model, network devices can self-organize into
the mutually satisfactory computation offloading
decisions.
2.2 Resource sharing process in social cloud systems
Different users may pursue individually to maximize
their profits. From the viewpoint of demanders, the pay-
off corresponds to the resource sharing benefit minus
the incurred cost to share the remote resource. There-




UDi xi;Λið Þ ¼ ℬi j; xið Þ−Ci j; xið Þ; j is a supplier ∈ ℕ and i≠j
ð1Þ
where X i is the requested resource amount, and ℬi(·)
and C i(·) are the benefit and cost functions for the
demander i. Usually, elastic applications have concave
benefit function, which provides monotone increasing
values in proportion to the assigned resource
amounts. According to the amount of assigned re-
source, ℬi(·) and Ci(·) are given by



















where bij is the assigned resource amount from the
supplier j. ζ is a cost control parameter, and ℳX is
the total resource amount to process the corresponding
application. ℰ(ℳX ) and ℰ bij
 
are the energy consump-
tion to execute ℳX and bij amount resources, respect-
ively. In this study, ℰ(·) is a linear function. Λi is the
accumulated contributiveness of the demander i. After the
remote execution, Λi is decreased by bij , i.e., Λi ¼ Λi−bij .
Based on the expected payoff UD(·), demanders can try to
find the best actions, i.e., the decision of X i amount.
From the viewpoint of suppliers, the payoff also corre-
sponds to the received benefit minus the incurred cost
to assign the sharing resource. However, in contrast to
the demanders’ interest, the sharing benefit is defined
according to the reciprocal cooperation, more generally,
the combination of evolution, altruism, and reciprocity.
In this study, we assume that users can be altruistic
toward others and react to other users’ altruism. There-
fore, the received benefit function is developed based on
the simple reciprocal mechanism. By considering the
service cost, the supplier j’s utility function to the
demander i USj ÞÞð

is defined as follows:
USj Zj;Λj; i
  ¼ Bj Zj;Λj; i −ℂj Z j  ð3Þ
where Z j is the amount of sharing resource of the sup-
plier j and Bj Z j;Λj; i
 
and ℂj (Z j) are the benefit and
cost functions for the supplier j, respectively. To get the
optimal payoff, suppliers try to maximize their benefit
function while minimizing their cost function. According
to the Zj and Λ values, Bj(·) and ℂj(·) are given by
Bj Zj;Λj; i
  ¼ θij  eZj þ ℱ j Λj h iandℂj Zj 









1− Λi= ΛiþΛjð Þ
  and ℱ j Λj 
¼ Zjmax Λj;Zj  
ð4Þ
θij is the supplier j’s altruistic parameter to the demander
i, and φj is the supplier j’s general altruistic propensity.
ℰ(T) and ℰ(Z j) are the energy consumption to execute
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the supplier j’s total resource (T) and Z j, respectively. λ
is the cost control parameter. After the resource sharing
process, Λj is increased by Zj, i.e., Λj =Λj + Zj.
Under dynamically changing SC environments, a fixed
altruistic propensity cannot effectively adapt to the
current SC condition. Therefore, the φ value should be
dynamically adjustable. In order to implement the φ
value adjustment process, suppliers should learn how to
perform well by interacting with demanders and dynam-
ically adjust their φ levels. Based on the exponential
weight learning algorithm [17], suppliers in our TS game
model can constantly adapt each φ level to get an appro-
priate attitude to their corresponding SC environments.
Let K be the set of all possible altruistic propensity
levels, i.e., φ∈K. In the proposed learning algorithm, the
probability of choosing the k’s propensity level in K at
time t Pφk tð Þ
 
is defined by







s:t:; ωj tð Þ ¼ ωj t−1ð Þ
 exp γ  U j t−1ð Þ




where γ ∈ [0,1] is an egalitarianism factor, which tunes
the desire to pick an action uniformly at random. That
is, if γ = 1, the weights have no effect on the choices at
any step. Kk k is the total number of propensity levels,
and U j t−1ð Þ is the obtained payoff USj ÞÞð

at time t − 1.
According to the distribution of P(t), suppliers can mod-
ify their φ levels without any impractical rationality as-
sumptions. During the step-by-step iteration, suppliers
individually adjust the φ value by using the dynamics of
feedback-based repeated process. Therefore, under
dynamic SC situations, the main advantage of our pro-
posed approach is a real-world practicality.
During real-world SC operations, multiple demanders
can request the resource sharing from the same supplier.
In this case, the role of supplier is to distribute dynamic-
ally the limited resource for each demander. To get a
fair-efficient resource allocation, we develop a new
resource distribution algorithm based on the relative
utilitarian bargaining model [18]; it can be applicable
and useful in a SC system with a frequently changing
situation. In the proposed scheme, we consider each
demanders’ Λ values as asymmetric bargaining powers.
Therefore, our bargaining solution (ℛ_ℬ) for resource
distribution is given by




















where Nj is the set of all resource requesting demanders
to the supplier j. ℛ_ℬ is a vector, which corresponds to
the resource distribution amounts to each demander.
In general, traditional game models have focused on
investigating which decisions are made or what decisions
should be made. Therefore, an equilibrium point is a
well-known solution concept in classical game models.
The strategy in equilibrium is the best response to the
strategies of the other users. In the proposed TS game
model, an equilibrium point of suppliers and demanders




S ¼ f argmax Zj∈Sj USj Zj;Λj; i n o; if j is a supplierwith single demander i




; if j is a supplier
with multiple demanders N
UD ¼ argmax xi∈Si UDi xi;Λið Þ
 




In recent decades, there had been many conceptual
and empirical critiques toward the equilibrium concept.
First, in the scenario of equilibrium, the players are
assumed to be fully rational. This perfect rational
assumption requires complete information; all factors of
the game should be common knowledge. However, in
reality, this assumption is actually disputable and rarely
holds. In particular, the hypothesis of exact rationality
does not apply to many interactive situations. Second,
the idea of equilibrium has mostly been developed in a
static setting. Under the dynamic changing SC environ-
ments, it cannot capture the adaptation of players to
change their strategies and reach equilibrium over time.
In this study, we introduce a new solution concept for
the TS game model; it is the obtained consensus with re-
ciprocal advantage. Such a consensus in multi-player
decision-making process is defined as Cooperative Con-
sensus Equilibrium (CCE). During TS game operations,
game players may adjust their altruistic propensities
when outcome contradicts their beliefs and adaptively
modify their altruistic propensities in an attempt to
reach a mutually acceptable decision vector. Therefore,
the solution concept of CCE presents a dynamic learning
interpretation to adapt the current SC situations. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study to address
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the iterative SC resource sharing problem with a recip-
rocal consensus solution concept.
Definition CCE is a system status that can be ob-
tained through repeating the TS game with receiving
feedbacks. When all the accumulated contributiveness
(Λ) of users are balanced, i.e., the relative contribution
differences of users are less than a pre-defined max-
























where ΤMk is the maximum resource capacity of user k’s
device. Therefore, the main idea of CCE is to minimize
the maximum unbalanced behavior degree of users.
2.3 The main steps of proposed algorithm
In recent years, SC has captured the attention of organi-
zations by offering elastic, scalable, and cost-effective
network resource management. In this study, we present
a new TS game model for the interaction of multiple
users with elastic applications. In the proposed TS game, a
sophisticated combination of the reciprocal relationship
and incentive mechanism can provide much more suitable
resource sharing algorithm. Based on the real-time inter-
active feedback process, each user can adapt its behavior
and act strategically to achieve a better profit. Usu-
ally, the traditional optimal solutions need exponential
time complexity. However, the proposed solution con-
cept only needs polynomial time complexity. There-
fore, our approach can offer a more realistic model
for multiple users with limited rationality. The proposed
algorithm is described by the following major steps.
Step 1: At the start, all Λ values are set to the relatively
same initial values, e.g., zero, and each altruistic
propensity φ is randomly chosen from K. When
reciprocal interaction history is unavailable, it is
a proper initialization. Control parameters, i.e.,
γ, λ and ΓΛ, are listed in Table 1.
Step 2: When an individual device needs an additional
resource, it becomes a demander and asks the x
amount resource to maximize the expected
payoff UD(·) according to Eq. (1).
Step 3: If the neighboring nodes of a demander have
enough available resources, they can be suppliers.
Suppliers provide the Z amount resource to
maximize the expected payoff US(·) according to
Eq. (3). When multiple demanders request the
resource simultaneously, a supplier distributes
the available resource using the Eq. (6).
Step 4: Using the simple two-sided matching algorithm,
a demander selects the most adaptable supplier,
and the resource is effectively shared. After the
resource sharing process, Λ is adjusted
dynamically.
Step 5: In each game stage game, φ of each mobile
device is periodically modified according to the
exponential weight learning algorithm. Based on
the adjusted Pφk;k∈K in Eq. (5), an actual φ value
of each device is selected stochastically.
Step 6: As game players, mobile devices are interrelated
with elastic applications, and interact with each
other in the TS game. Under widely diverse SC
environments, this iterative feedback procedure
continues to reach the CCE status.
Step 7: Mobile devices self-monitors the current SC
situation in a distributed online manner; the
next iteration resumes at step 2.











I 1.28 Mbps 0.64 Mbps 1,800 s (30 min)
II 2.56 Mbps 1.28 Mbps 1,800 s (30 min)
III 3.84 Mbps 1.92 Mbps 600 s (5 min)
IV 5.12 Mbps 2.56 Mbps 600 s (5 min)
V 6.40 Mbps 3.20 Mbps 1,800 s (30 min)
VI 7.24 Mbps 3.62 Mbps 1,800 s (30 min)
VII 8.12 Mbps 4.06 Mbps 3,000 s (50 min)
VIII 9.48 Mbps 4.74 Mbps 1,200 s (20 min)
Parameter Value Description
n 30 The number of mobile devices in SC
φ 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4 Altruistic propensity levels for each user
λ 1 The cost control parameter for a
demander
Kk k 5 The number of altruistic propensity
levels
γ 0.3 The egalitarianism factor for learning
algorithm
ΓΛ 0.2≤ ΓΛ ≤ 0.8 A pre-defined maximum relative
contribution bound
Parameter Description
Λi The contribution level of the player i in the SC community
X i The requested resource amount of the demander i
ζ A cost control parameter
ℳX The total resource amount to process the corresponding
application
Z j The amount of sharing resource of the supplier j
θij The supplier j’s altruistic parameter to the demander i
φj The supplier j’s general altruistic propensity
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3 Performance evaluation
In this section, we compare the performance of the pro-
posed scheme with other existing schemes [10, 12, 13]
and confirm the performance superiority of the proposed
approach using a simulation model. Our simulation model
is a representation of an SC system that includes social
network users and the behavior and interactions of these
users. In order to ensure that the model is sufficiently
generic to be valid in the real-world, the assumptions used
in our simulation model were as follows:
 The simulated system consisted of 30 social network
users for the SC platform.
 We followed the traditional network topology,
decentralized, and partially connected topology.
 In the network coverage area, network mobile
devices executed elastic applications. For each
device, application service request was Poisson with
rate ρ (services/s) and the range of the offered
service load was varied from 0 to 3.0.
 Each mobile device has a different resource amount.
There were five resource capacities for the devices
and the device i’s capacity (ℭi,i ∈ ℕ) was ℭi ∈ (10,
12.5, 15, 17.5, and 20 Mbps).
 To reduce the computation complexity, the amount
of resource allocation is specified in terms of basic
units (BUs), where one BU is the minimum amount
(e.g., 320 kbps in our system) for the resource
sharing process.
 The service durations of applications are
exponentially distributed with different means for
different multimedia application types.
 Network performance measures obtained based on
100 simulation runs were plotted as a function of
the offered service load.
 The performance criteria obtained through
simulation were resource usability, CCE
convergence ratio, and normalized system
throughput.
Table 1 shows the system parameters used in the
simulation. In order to emulate a real SC system and
perform a fair comparison, we used the system parame-
ters for a realistic simulation model.
In this paper, we compared the performance of the pro-
posed scheme with existing schemes: the SCC scheme
[10], ISC scheme [12], and RSC scheme [13]. These exist-
ing schemes were recently developed as effective SC man-
agement algorithms; all the schemes have polynomial time
complexity. Compared to these schemes, we can confirm
the superiority of our proposed approach.
Figure 1 presents the performance comparison of each
scheme in terms of resource usability in the SC systems.
In this study, resource usability is a measure of how
system resources are actually used. Traditionally, moni-
toring how resources are used is one of the most critical
aspects of SC management. During the SC system
operations, all schemes produced similar resource us-
ability. However, the suppliers in our proposed scheme
adaptively distribute resources to the demanders while
considering reciprocal fairness. Therefore, the resource
usability produced by the proposed scheme was higher
than the other schemes from low to heavy service load
intensities.
Fig. 1 SC system resource usability
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Figure 2 shows the normalized SC system throughput.
From the simulation results obtained, it is observed
that the proposed scheme can adapt to the current
SC system situation and demonstrates better through-
put owing to the iterative TS game approach. In
general, excellent network throughput is a highly
desirable property for real-world SC system opera-
tions. Under different application service loads, the
proposed scheme can provide a higher throughput
than the other schemes.
The curves in Fig. 3 illustrate the CCE convergence
ratio under different pre-defined maximum bounds (ΓΛ).
If all users’ relative contribution differences are within
the ΓΛ, CCE is obtained, i.e., CCE convergence ratio is 1.
Owing to the feedback-based reciprocal mechanism, the
proposed scheme can interactively learn the best altruis-
tic propensity strategy and adaptively adjust their φ
levels to reach the CCE status. Due to the self-regarding
feature, these control decisions are made by an entirely
distributed fashion.
Fig. 2 Normalized system throughput
Fig. 3 CCE convergence ratio
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As expected, CCE convergence ratio decreases while
increasing service loads or decreasing ΓΛ values.
The simulation results presented in Figs. 1 and 2 dem-
onstrate the performance of the proposed and other
existing schemes and verify that the proposed scheme can
provide attractive network performance. The proposed
scheme constantly monitors the current conditions for an
adaptive SC system management and successfully exhibits
excellent performance. As expected, the performance en-
hancements provided by the proposed scheme outper-
formed the existing schemes [10, 12, 13]. The curves
shown in Fig. 3 demonstrate the CCE convergence ratio of
our proposed scheme. This result is intuitively correct.
4 Conclusions
The ever increasing use of social networks and arrival of
new computing paradigms like cloud computing has
urged the need to integrate these platforms for the
better and inexpensive usage of resources. Sharing cloud
resources in such environments would be very helpful.
This article addresses a new resource control algorithm
for SC systems. Using the TS game model, users itera-
tively observed the received payoffs and repeatedly
modified their altruistic propensities to effectively
manage SC resources. The proposed scheme enables the
sharing of SC resources between users via reciprocal
cooperative relationships and can effectively approach
the CCE status using a step-by-step feedback process.
Compared with the existing schemes, the simulation
results confirmed that the proposed game-based method
could improve the performance under dynamically chan-
ging SC system environments whereas other existing
schemes could not offer such an attractive performance.
For future research, the SC paradigm presents a rich
environment. One major area of future work is adapting
the SC protocols that facilitate big data streaming from
SC to Internet of Things (IoT). In addition, we are also
looking further at QoS and QoE, as well as data security,
privacy, and reliability issues. In parallel to these efforts,
we plan to deploy the social storage cloud to provide a
platform for further experimentation. In particular, we
aim to explore system performance and user interactions
on a much larger scale.
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